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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. : 
BEN J. WAUNEKA, : Case No. 14306 
Defendant-Appellant 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Ben J. Wauneka, appeals from a jury verdict of 
guilty of manslaughter in the Third Judicial District, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced 
to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for the term provided for 
by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and 
judgment thereon and an order directing the case be remanded to the 
Third Judicial Court with directions to dismiss or in the alternative 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant was found guilty in the lower court of the crime 
of manslaughter. The charge against the defendant arose out of the 
death of his wife. 
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The defendant Ben J. Wauneka and his wife, Rose Marie Wauneka 
resided at 1229 Stringham Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. On 
January 22, 1975, at approximately 8:00 a.m. the appellant, Ben J. 
Wauneka, called the police department and requested ambulance 
service. Upon their arrival, the authorities found the appellantfs 
wife, Rose Marie Wauneka, on the couple's bed with bruises about 
her body. 
On further investigation by the Salt Lake City Police Department, 
it was discovered that articles of clothing were in the bathtub, 
paper toweling in the wastebasket of the bedroom and a wash cloth in the 
sink in the bathroom. There appeared to be blood stains on a bra that 
was found in the bathtub, on the bed sheets upon which Mrs. Wauneka 
was lying, and on the paper toweling found in the wastebasket. 
Conversations with the appellant revealed that both he and 
his wife were alcoholics and on the night of January 21, 1975, they 
had both engaged in a considerable amount of drinking. 
The appellant at all times denied striking his wife and told 
of how they became very intoxicated on the night of January 22, 1975, 
and Mrs. Wauneka fell down twice while she was walking from the 
kitchen to the bedroom. A combination of the fall and the drinking 
rendered her condition such that she was unable to stand and the 
defendant sat her against the end of the bed and tried to bring her 
around by pouring water on her. The defendant being intoxicated went 
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to sleep on the bed and did not wake up until the following morning 
and then became concerned about the condition of his wife and 
placed her on the bed and called the authorities. 
A physical inspection of the Wauneka home by the police found 
no object that could have been used to strike Rose Marie Wauneka 
and an inspection by Detective Saunders of the appellant's hands 
revealed no evidence that would be consistent with hands that had 
been used to deliver numerous blows. 
At no time did the State offer any evidence showing that the 
defendant committed any wrongful act that resulted in the death of 
Rose Marie Wauneka. The entire case was submitted to the jury 
on the strength of the medical testimony that in his opinion some of 
the bruises was the result of blows by a human fist. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE STATE TO 
INTRODUCE STATEMENTS MADE BY DECEASED ROSE MARIE 
WAUNEKA. 
The testimony of April Dahl and Regina Saunders called by 
the State mostly related to conversations they had with the deceased 
Rose Marie Wauneka several days prior to the day she died. The 
introduction of these statements were objected to by the appellant 
but the trial court permitted the statements to come in on the theory 
that the statements could be used for the limited purpose to show her 
then existing state of mind and fear of the appellant. The trial 
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court relied on Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63 (12)(a) which is 
one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
An example of the statements complained of are as follows 
in the direct examination of April Dahl: 
Q. And what did she say: 
Brown: Objection on the basis of hearsay. 
Court: Overruled. 
A. I asked her what was the matter and she said "you call 
the police for me" and I said "Well, Rose, why don't you call the 
police, there is a phone right over there," and she said "no" she 
says, "I can't, if Ben finds out I called the police, he'll kill 
me." (T.138) 
Q. You say she didn't inform you why she wanted you to call 
the police, is that correct? 
Brown: Your Honor, this is repetitious, she's already answered 
that question. Mr. Yocom is now leading his witness. 
Court: Objection will be overruled. 
A. She did, I'm sorry, she did, I'm rattled. 
Q. Just try and relax, April, I know its a tense situation. 
When did this occur in the conversation? 
A. At the very first, she said "Ben's beating me" and you 
know she said you call the police" and I said "Rose, why don't you 
call the police because I'm at work, it's not good to do that" and 
she says "no, he'll kill me if he finds out I made the phone call" 
so that's -- (T.139) 
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The followind direct examination of Regina Saunders is another 
example of prejudicial statements that should have been excluded 
by the trial court: 
Q. Now this conversation took place in English between 
the two of you? 
A. Both English and Navajo. 
Q. Did she speak Navajo? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I assume you do, too. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you say to her with regard to her physical 
condition? 
A. I just asked her what was the matter with her and she said 
that-
Brown: Your Honor, this is not proper, this does not come 
within the rules that the Court has mentioned, this is a question 
and answer situation. The rules that the Court--we have been 
discussing is a declaration by one person and this is not the 
situation at all, I would object to it. 
Court: Objection to the last question will be sustained. 
Yocom: Did she say anything to you about her physical or 
mental condition at that time? 
Brown: Objection, your Honor, leading. 
Yocom: O.K. Answer that yes or no. 
Court: Objection overruled. 
Yes. 
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Yocom: And what did she tell you? 
Brown: Objection, Your Honor. 
Court: Overruled. 
Yocom: Go ahead. 
A. Well, she just said that, you know, about her bruises that 
she was -- her husband, she was her husband's punching bag or 
something. 
Q. Do you recall exactly what she said to you? 
A. Well she said that, I asked her how she got all the bruises 
and she said that her husband beat her up and I asked her, of course 
I have seen her quite a few times that way and she has never told 
me just how those happened but that time she did, she said that I'm 
just his punching bag. 
Brown: I object and move to have that stircken 
Court: Objection overruled. 
(T. 192-193) 
Even though there is not an abundance of law in Utah on the 
percise issue raised here it is clear from the rulings in other 
jurisdictions and discussions by recognized authorities that the 
lower Court should have excluded the declarations of Mr. Wauneka. 
Briefly state, the state of mind exception to the hearsay 
rule allows such statements to show future intent of the declarant 
to perform an act if that act is at issue. Rule 63 (12)(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. It is also well established that some 
evidence while bearing some logical relevance to the case, may be 
excluded where, in the discretion of the judge its probative value 
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is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or con-
fusion. Rule 45 Utah Rules of Evidence. "In a case where . . . the 
danger of harm from improper use by the jury of the offered 
declaration is substantial, the judge's discretion to exclude 
the declaration has been recognized". McCormick on Evidence, 
Sec. 294 at 696 (2d Ed. 1972). 
The threshold requirement of admissibility of hearsay statements 
of the declarant's "fear of the defendant" in homicide cases is some 
substantial degree of relevance to a material issue in the case. 
Such relevance has historically been found by courts when the 
defendant has raised the defense of self-defense or suicide. 
However, when no such defenses are raised, the declarant's (deceased's) 
state of mind is not an issue. As the Wyoming Supreme Court stated 
in State v. Kump, 76-Wyo. 273, 301 P.2d 808 (1956): 
The attitude of the mind of deceased toward the defendant 
as evidenced by outward manifestations, such as 
declarations, is at times relevant when the defendant 
pleads self-defense. [citations] In such case the 
attitude of mind is to show the hostile attitude of 
the deceased which would justify self-defense or perhaps 
reduce the degree of the crime, or the severity of the 
sentence. That is not the situation in the case at 
bar. The important fact here is the attitude of the mind 
of the defendant, not that of the deceased. The attitude 
of mind of the deceased toward the defendant was immaterial, 
(emphasis in original) 
The court, therefore, held inadmissable, in spite of a limiting 
instruction by the trial judge that the jury not consider testimony 
except as "tending to show the attitude of mind of the deceased 
towards the defendant," hearsay statements relating to various threats 
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Made by the defendant toward the deceased. 
People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580 (1969), offers 
another example of judicial unwillingness to extend the state of mind 
exception to include declarations of the deceased where deceased's 
state of mind was not in issue. There, the prosecution offered to 
show that the deceased had said prior to her death, "I know he's 
going to kill me.11 The prosecution urged that this was admissible 
as bearing on the victim's state of mind which was relevant to 
"show the probabilities of the decedent's conduct . . . that she 
would not have done anything to provoke him." The defense argued 
that the deceased's state of mind was not relevant to any issue 
in the case. The California Supreme Court agree, holding that the 
"acts or conduct of the declarant . . . at the time of the homicide 
were simply not in dispute." There was no defense of self-defense 
raised in the case. "In such circumstances it must be concluded 
that the hearsay statement . . . was improperly admitted into 
evidence." Ld. at 585. 
Some courts have recognized that the deceased's state of mind 
might be relevant when the defendant claims the death was accidental 
but only when the declaration of the state of mind in some way 
negates the claim of accidental death--as when the defense 
claims deceased dies as a result of accidental misfiring of a 
weapon she was handling and the declaration was that the deceased 
was afraid of guns and would not, therefore, be likely to have been 
handling one. Such considerations are not present here. Mrs. 
Wauneka's claim that she was afraid of her husband because he had been 
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beating her does not speak to the issue of her sustaining her fatal 
injuries by accident. It, therefore, does not qualify under this 
theory of the exception's applicability. 
Even when the court does recognize that the decedent's state of 
mind has some relevance, where the risk of prejudice of an exceptionally 
damning nature is high, even a substantial amount of relevance is 
outweighed. For example, in People v. Lew, 68 Cal. 2d 774, 441 P.2d 
942 (1968), the trial court's admission of a variety of hearsay 
statements of the victim, including a number of alleged threats made 
by the defendant, was held to be error by the California Supreme 
Court. The court first analyzed the issues to determine if the 
statements were relevant to any inquiry necessary to the case. 
It found that they were relevant to the defendant's claim that the 
victim had been handling the gun when it went off accidentally and 
killed her in that it rebutted the liklihood that she would do so 
because of her fear of guns and of the defendant. Nevertheless, 
the court held that it was error to have admitted the testimony 
since it implied past misconduct on the part of the defendant and 
was also essentially unreliable. The court stated that "such 
testimony is not admissable . . . because to try to separate state of 
mind from the truth of the charges is an almost impossible task." 
Id. at 945. 
The Lew case relied principally on People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal. 
2d 881, 362 P.2d 473 (1961). In Hamilton, the only question was 
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whether the defendant had committed first or second degree murder. 
He admitted killing the deceased, but claimed it had been done 
without pre-meditation and deliberation and that he had gone to the 
victim's house at her invitation. In rebuttal the prosecution 
introduced over the object of defendant statements made by the wife 
to witnesses that she was afraid of the defendant, that he had beaten 
her and that he had threatened to kill her. The jury was carefully 
instructed not to consider these statements as true as to the beatings, 
but only as state of mind evidence. The Supreme Court nevertheless 
held it error to admit such testimony since the state of mind was 
necessarily dependent on some past acts of the defendant that were very 
prejudicial to his case and that it was beyond the jury's power to 
distinguish the purposes for which the evidence was admitted. 
In an exhaustive and well-reasoned opinion, the D.C. circuit 
court examined the st&te of mind exception as it had developed at 
common law and under both the Uniform Rules of Evidence (which are 
used in Utah) and the Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts, 
and came to the conclusion: 
The rule then to be distilled from the better reasoned 
decisions is that a victim's extra-judicial declarations of 
fear of the defendant are admissible under the stateof mind 
exception to the hearsay rule with a limiting instruction only 
if there is a manifest need for such evidence, i.e., if it 
is relevant to a material issue in the case. Where there is 
a substantial liklihood of prejudice to the defendant's case 
in the admission of such testimony, it is inadmissible 
if it bears only a remote or artificial relationship to 
the legal or factual issues raised in the case. Even where 
there is substantial relevance, the additional factual 
matters in the statement may simply be too explosive to be 
contained by the limiting instruction, in which case 
exclusion of the testimony is also necessitated. 
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United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
In Brown the court carefully analyzed all the relevant factors 
that a court should use to determine the admissibility of hearsay 
testimony sought to be introduced under the exception in question. 
The court focused in particular upon the problem of statements that 
not only exhibit the declarent's state of mind, but which also 
narrate details of past misconduct by the defendant; statements like 
Mrs. Wauneka's "Ifm afraid of my husband because he beats me and I 
think he is going to kill me.,f The court emphasized that: 
One of the principal concerns voiced in the cases revolves 
around state of mind testimony that is inextricably bound 
up with the relation of past events or conduct on the part 
of the accused. Rarely does the testimony stop at the point 
"I am afraid of D." More often it is express: "I'm 
afraid of D because he beat me and threatened to kill me.11 
Most courts are rightly leary of such testimony since it 
trenches closely upon the Shepard doctrine. (Shepard v. 
United States, 290 U.S. 96 [1933]). After Shepard, 
it has been unquestionably accepted that to allow hearsay 
statements which relate past events on memory or belief 
under the state of mind exception would in effect swallow 
the hearsay rule. Therefore no court would admit such 
testimony for the purpose of proving the truth of the 
matter alleged, yet many will accept it if introduced solely 
on the state of mind issue with a limiting instruction. 
But, as in Shepard, when such statements bear close proximity 
to the issue of guilty or innocence it is equally clear that 
the limiting instruction may be of dubious utility at best. 
Thus the more narration of past acts or conduct of the defendant 
in the statement, the greater the danger of jury misuse. 
Where the external facts in the statement are so inflammatory 
as to unduly arouse the jury's emotions of prejudice of 
hostility, any evidence, whether or not involving state of 
mind issues, must be excluded where its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its unduly dramatic or emotional 
impact so as to create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. 
Id. at 775-77. 
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The court's position here is consistent with the majority of 
jurisdictions which have rules upon this question. See, for example, 
State v. Bartolon, 495 P.2d 772 (Ore. 1972), Brown v. People, 
273 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1954) Commonwealth v. Lippert, 311 A.2d 586 (Pa. 
1973), Rule 55 Other Crimes or Civil Wrongs. 
In summary, the state of mind exception is applicable only 
when the declarant's own state of mind is a material issue in the 
case, even if it is an issue, prejudicial statements contained in the 
declaration should be excluded. It is important to bear in mind that 
in the instant case, Mrs. Wauneka's highly prejudicial remarks in no 
way contributed to a needed understanding of her conduct because her 
conduct is not an issue. The use of such, statements only served to 
prejudice the defendant's case by placing before the jury unsubstan-
tiated claims of prior misconduct by the defendant. 
It is obvious that Mr. Yocom the states attorney never 
intended to use the statements for the limited purpose of showing 
Mrs. Wauneka's state of mind. The following remark in Mr. Yocom's 
closing argument clearly shows that he intended to show prior unproven 
bad acts as evidence that the defendant committed the act in 
question*: 
But how about that is that simple enough to hit hard, 
hit and hit and hit repeatedly and not have cuts on those 
knuckles? Very simple, I suppose that if you are as 
experienced in wife beating as I think the evidence has 
s h o w n . . . 
Brown: Objection your honor, this is improper argument and I 
would move the court to have the jury disregard the last 
statement of counsel. 
Court: Objection is overruled 
(T.317) 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE STATE TO INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE THAT TENDED TO SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED"^ 
CRIME ON ANOTHER SPECIFIED OCCASION PRIOR TO THE ACT IN 
QUESTION. 
The lower court not only allowed hearsay statements of the 
deceased to be considered by the jury but at the same time compounded 
the prejudicial error by permitting witnesses to describe Mrs. 
Wauneka1s physical appearance. The evidence complained of is as follows: 
Tr. 137 April Dahl 
Q. Would you describe first of all, April the physical appearance 
of Rose Wauneka, what she looked like. 
Brown: Objection, your Honor, not material. 
Court: Overruled. 
A. She had very puffy eyes, that were red from crying and she 
had a bruise on the right side of her facfe up high around the cheek-
bone and she was very shook, very uptight, she was shaking, in fact, 
when she was handing me some money. 
Tr. 191, Regia Betonney 
Q. Did you observe anything unusual about her physical condition? 
Brown: Objection, not material, your Honor. 
Court: Overruled. 
Yocom: You may answer that question. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Could you describe that for us? 
A. She had bruises all over her, she had one on her cheek, chin, 
one on the forehead and she had bruises on her arms. 
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The above questions and answers could be used by the jury for 
only one purpose and that would be to show that the defendant committed 
assaults on the deceased on prior occasions. It is clear that 
evidence of other crimes of civil wrongs is prohibited by Utah 
Rules of Evidence Rule 55 which states: 
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed 
a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is 
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime 
or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he 
committed another crime or civil wrong on another 
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, 
such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove 
some other material fact including absence of 
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. 
In the case of State v. Huggins, 18 Utah 2d, 219, 418 P.2d 978 
(1966) the Utah Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion held that the 
lower court erred in permitting witnesses to testify to a similar, 
unproven offense. The reasoning in the Huggins is stated by Justice 
Henroid as follows: 
The prejudice engendered by permitting this witness to 
testify, informing the jury that her mother had filed a 
similar charge against defendant that very day, seems to 
us to have been an incurable prejudice that could have been 
the difference between a reasonable doubt and a foregone 
conclusion in the minds of the veniremen. 
The argument that the modern trend is to allow evidence 
of other similar offenses to show a propensity, was 
supported by and large by cases where evidence of previous 
convictions was extant and admissible to support the view. 
Here there was no conviction of the charge leveled by 
this witness1 mother the day of the trial. For aught we 
know, such charge may have resulted in acquittal the 
next day. Had it been tried before this case, and an 
acquittal had resulted, no one would have ventured the 
suggestion that such an acquittal could have been used to 
help convict the defendant in the instant case. In the 
aggregate, the error here was prejudicial requiring a new 
trial. (Emphasis in original) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is contended that the error committed in the instant case 
is even more compelling than the error committed in the Huggins, 
case. In the instant case substantial evidence of prior unproven 
assaults came in by way of hearsay statements not subject to 
cross-examination. As stated by Justice Henroid on page 221 of 
P.2d citation: "For aught we know, such charge may have resulted 
in an acquittal the next day.11 
The description of Mrs. Wauneka1 s physical condition coupled 
with her hearsay statements complained of in Point No. 1 would 
seem to be "an incurable prejudice that could have been the difference 
between a reasonable doubt and a foregoin conclusion in the minds 
of the venireman." State v. Huggins, supra. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRORED IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY 
AND TO PERMIT THE JURY TO SPECULATE UPON THE GUlET 
OR INNOCENCE OF THE DEFENDANT? 
A review of the record will reveal a complete lack of evidence 
that the defendant committed any wrongful act that resulted in the 
death of Mrs. Wauneka. The very weak medical testimony that a 
human fist could have been used to deliver blows to the deceased 
is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
some act that resulted in the unfortunate death of Mrs. Wauneka. 
The case of State v. Bassett 495 P.2d 318, 27 Utah 2d 272 (1972) 
is directly in point with the instant case. In the Bassett case the Utah 
Supreme Court on page 275 Utah Reports stated: 
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In this case there being no evidence to show any act 
on the part of the defendants or either of them, it was 
error for the court to submit the case to the jury 
to speculate upon the guilt or innocence of the 
defendants. 
To permit a conviction to stand on the caliber of 
evidence produced in the Bassett case and the instant case would 
tend to disregard the burden of proof required in the criminal justice 
system. The degree of proof would be reduced to the standards required 
in a mere tort action instead of beyond a reasonable doubt required in 
a criminal prosecution. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the lack of evidence and the erroneous rulings 
of the lower court relating to hearsay declarations and prior misconduct 
it is compelling that the error committed bg corrected so that 
the Utah Rules of Evidence are better understood. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Appellant 
< 
i 
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